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Abstract
Android utilizes a security mechanism that requires apps to request permission
for accessing sensitive user data, e.g., contacts and SMSs, or certain system
features, e.g., camera and Internet access. However, Android apps tend to be
overprivileged, i.e., they often request more permissions than necessary. This
raises the security problem of overprivilege. To alleviate the overprivilege prob-
lem, this paper proposes MPDroid, an approach that combines static analysis
and collaborative filtering to identify the minimum permissions for an Android
app based on its app description and API usage. Given an app, MPDroid first
employs collaborative filtering to identify the initial minimum permissions for
the app. Then, through static analysis, the final minimum permissions that an
app really needs are identified. Finally, it evaluates the overprivilege risk by
inspecting the apps extra privileges, i.e., the unnecessary permissions requested
by the app. Experiments are conducted on 16,343 popular apps collected from
Google Play. The results show that MPDroid outperforms the state-of-the-art
approach significantly.
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1. Introduction
In the past decade, the popularity and ubiquitous use of smartphones have
greatly fueled the growth of mobile application (referred to as app hereafter).
According to AppBrain1, as of September 2018, the number of available apps
on Google Play-the world largest Android app store, has exceeded 2.8 million.
Apps are now playing an extremely important role in our daily life. Many
mobile users store a lot of sensitive and private data on their devices. Such data
are at the risk of exposure to malicious activities, which has become a major
vulnerability of the entire mobile ecosystem [1].
Android has long been a major target of malicious apps [2]. One of its
major vulnerabilities is the permission mechanism [3]. Android’s permission
mechanism requires apps to request permission for accessing sensitive user data,
e.g., contacts and SMSs, or certain system features, e.g., camera and Internet
access. Thus, the security of Android heavily depends on the effectiveness of this
permission mechanism. A major threat is that a malicious app may furtively
request extra permissions for accessing users’ sensitive and private data. To
minimize this threat, some researchers have designed user-oriented permission
prompts to ensure that smartphone users are properly notified of the permissions
requested by apps. However, due to the complexity of Android’s permission
mechanism, most of these efforts have proven to be ineffective [4] [5]. The
main reason is that most users do not fully understand Android’s permissions
mechanism. They often simply ignore the prompts and accept apps’ requests
for permissions without inspecting the prompts [6]. As a result, apps can easily
obtain extra permissions, which increase the risks of user privacy leaks. This is
referred to as the over privilege problem [7]. A study conducted by Yu et al. [8]
shows that more than 80% of Android apps are overprivileged. The vulnerability
of Android’s permission mechanism puts mobile users at the risk of privacy leak
in the mobile ecosystem [9]. This has become one of the major threats to the
1http://developer.Android.com/guide/platform/index.html.
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health of mobile ecosystem [10]. This threat is made even more serious by benign
apps that are overprivileged by excessively requested permissions [7] [11].
The mainstream approach for enhancing the Android permission mechanism
is to identify over-declared permissions requested by an app [12] [13] [14] [15]
and recommend reasonable permissions for an app [16] [17] [18]. A major and
common limitation of these approaches is that the requested permissions are
considered as the permissions that the app really uses. However, this is not
always true, especially for malicious apps, they often declare more permissions
than they really needs. To address this issue, it is important to identify the
minimum permissions, i.e., permissions that are truly needed by an app for
the implementation of its functionalities. When given the minimum permission
for an app, whether it is a malicious or benign application, the over-declared
permissions can be identified and pruned without impacting the functionalities
of the app.
In this paper, we propose Minimum Permission for Android (MPDroid),
an approach for Android app risk evaluation based on the identification of min-
imum permissions. MPDroid identifies the initial minimum permissions for the
target app by inspecting the permissions requested by apps that are similar to
the target app, following the main idea of collaborative filtering-if two users
(apps) u and v have similar behaviors (functional description), they will act on
other items (permissions) similarly [19]. Then, it obtains the final minimum per-
missions for the target app by using a functionality point2-permission identify
method based on API-used code permission and the app declared permission.
The major contributions of this paper are as follows:
• An over-declared permission identification algorithm is proposed. MP-
Droid employs the LDA technique and an improved collaborative filtering
recommendation algorithm to identify and remove over-declared permis-
2The functionality point in this paper refers to functionality topic which is obtained from
the description of the app by LDA model
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sion by an app. It then obtains a initial minimum permission set corre-
sponding to the app’s description (i.e., declaration functionalities).
• We employ static analysis to statically parse app related code permissions
and analyze the permissions that the app actually calls. In addition,
we present a functionality point-permission set model to further improve
the permission configuration of the apps and obtain the final minimum
permission set.
• Based on MPDroid, a permission-based risk assessment framework is pro-
posed to detect the risk coefficient for the target app, compared with the
state-of-the-art methods, the performance of detecting app risks is im-
proved by 67.5% for the benign apps. In addition, to enable others to use
MPDroid, we have published our source code and dataset on GitHub3.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 motivates this re-
search. Section 3 presents the risky app identification process. Section 4 evalu-
ates MPDroid experimentally. Section 5 reviews the related work and Section
6 concludes the paper.
2. Motivation
The permissions needed by an app are often related to its functionalities,
which can be extracted from the app’s description. For example, an application
that describes itself as a social networking will likely need permissions related to
the mobile device’s address book and will need the permission READ CONTACTS.
A number of malware and privacy-invasive applications have been known to de-
clare more permissions than their purported functionality warrants [33], which
is usually considered to be unreasonable. Take a screen wallpaper app named
bollywoodlive for example. We parsed its APK file and found that it actually ap-
plied for WAKE LOCK, CHANGE WIFI STATE and RECEIVE BOOT COMPLETED
3https://github.com/ztxjm123/MPDroid
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Figure 1: Association between app’s functionalities and permissions
permissions. These permissions are completely irrelevant to its own functional
description which may be harm for the privacy of app users.
An app should not request more permissions than necessary to support its
functionalities, and the developer should minimize the number of permissions
required by apps to reduce the app security risk. This is also recommended
by the Android official4. However, sometimes the permissions requested by an
app deviate significantly from the permissions required by the functionalities
specified in the app’s description [20], not only the malicious app, but also
for many benign apps [21], there are also exist declaration the unnecessary
permissions problems. In this context, the research problem is defined as:
Q1:Given an app ai and its functional description information
DFi, then how to obtain the minimum permission set that the app
really needs?
To solve the above problem, MPDroid is proposed in this paper with the
aim to identify the minimum permissions for an app, which is referred to as the
description-minimum permission set in our work. The basic idea of MPDroid
is to establish a mapping relationship between functionalities and correspond-
ing permissions to identify abnormal permissions. As shown in Figure 1, the
4 https://developer.android.com/training/articles/security-tips.html#
RequestingPermissions
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Figure 2: The Process of Overprivileged App Identification
functionalities and the permissions of an app are correlated. An app usually pro-
vides multiple functionalities and requests permissions. A mapping relationship
between its functionalities and permissions can be established.
Figure 2 presents MPDroid’s process of identifying the minimum permis-
sions of an app. We assume that the target app obtains the permission set
PS={P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6} extracted from its APK. When the target app
is processed by the Over-declared Permissions Identification Module (Step 1),
the target app’s permission set becomes PS={P1, P2, P4, P5}. P3 and P6
will be removed as over-declared permissions. For instance, Table 1 shows an
example of an app processed by MPDroid. The app Bollywood Live applied
for 12 permissions. The permission CHANGE WIFI STATE, GET TASKS,
RECEIVE BOOT COMPLETED are over-declared permissions, because the
functionalities in the application description do not refer to these three permis-
sions.
Meanwhile, the Functionality Point-Permission Set Identification Module
(Step 2) can further identify the target app’s permission set PS={P1, P2, P4}
as its final description-minimum permission set. P5 is removed because its
support degree (details see in Section 3.4) is too low. For example, In Table
1, permission P5 means SET WALLPAPER, READ LOGS, and SEND SMS.
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Because their permission support degree is lower than the threshold, they will be
filtered out. The lower the permission support degree means the lower possible
of the permissions required by the app. Then, the rest permissions we regard
as the final minimum permissions set of the app.
Table 1: An Example of App Processed by MPDroid
App Name Bollywood Live
declared permission
ACCESS NETWORK STATE, ACCESS WIFI
STATE, CHANGE WIFI STATE, GET ACC
OUNTS, GET TASKS, INTERNET, READ L
OGS, RECEIVE BOOT COMPLETED, R
EAD PHONE STATE, SEND SMS, SET WALL
PAPER, WAKE LOCK
After processed by
step 1
ACCESS NETWORK STATE, ACCESS WIFI
STATE, GET ACCOUNTS, INTERNET,
SET WALLPAPER, READ PHONE STATE,
SEND SMS, READ LOGS, WAKE LOCK
After processed by
step 2
ACCESS NETWORK STATE, ACCESS WI
FI STATE, GET ACCOUNTS, INTERNET,
READ PHONE STATE, WAKE LOCK
Finally, the Permission-Based Risk Evaluation Module (Step 3) identifies
the permission P3 as a risk permission (defined as equation (14) in Section 3.5).
As a result, the target app is regarded as a risk app because P3 belongs to
both unexpected permissions (defined as equation (13) in Section 3.5) and risk
permissions. The details of each module will be discussed in Section 3.
3. Risk App Identification
MPDroid employs a permission-based app risk evaluation process for mea-
suring the risk level of an app. Figure 3 shows the process which includes the
following 4 phases.
7
Figure 3: The Overview of MPDroid
1. Over-declared permissions identification. In this phase, MPDroid employs
an improved collaborative filtering algorithm to identify and remove over-
declared permissions in the app.
2. Initial Description-minimum Permission Set Identification. In this phase,
MPDroid iterates the over-declared permissions identification process to
obtain the app’s initial description-minimum permission set.
3. Functionality Point-permission Set Identification. In this phase, MP-
Droid recommends the app permissions that combine with the actual
declared permission and real requested permissions of the app actually
uses by calling APIs. As a consequence, MPDroid further refines the ini-
tial description-minimum permission set of the app to obtain the final
description-minimum permission set.
4. Permission-based Risk Evaluation. In this phase, MPDroid calculates the
risk level of the app and classifies the app as risky or not.
3.1. Definitions
In order to establish the mapping relationship between app functionalities
and permissions, MPDroid first identifies the functionality points implemented
by all the local apps’ descriptions, and then establishes a mapping relationship
between the app and its functionalities. This is referred to as description func-
tionality point extraction. Secondly, MPDroid detects the list of permissions
that the app actually requests, and establishes a mapping relationship between
the app and its permissions. This is referred as declared permission extraction.
Here, we give some formal definitions.
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Definition 1: An app ai is defined as:
ai =< DFi, DPi, CPi,MinPi > (1)
where DFi represents a
′
is functionalities, DPi represents a
′
is declared permis-
sions, CPi represents a
′
is API-based permissions, i.e., permissions parsed from
the code, and MinPi represents a
′
is minimum permissions identified by MP-
Droid.
Definition 2: An app’s declared functionalities are defined as:
DFi =< DFi,1, . . . , DFi,k >, 0 < DFi,k < 1 (2)
where DFi,k is the probability of declared functionality point of the app and k
is the number of description functionality points contained in app’s description.
Definition 3: Declarative permission information for Android app.
DPi =< DPi,1, . . . , DPi,m > (3)
DPi represents the permission set declared by ai, and m represents the number
of permissions extracted from a′is AndroidManifest file.
Definition 4: Code permission information for Android apps.
CPi =< CPi,1, . . . , CPi,n > (4)
where CPi represents the code permissions of ai. MPDroid first employ static
analysis to obtain the Android-related API that the APK calls, followed by the
Android-related API to map to the its permissions. Here, n is the number of
permissions that are parsed based on the code and n≥ 0.
Definition 5: Minimum permission set information for Android
app.
MinPi =< MinPi,1, . . . ,MinPi,q > (5)
where MinPi represents a
′
is minimum permissions identified by MPDroid, and
q is the number of permissions in MinPi.
Based on the above definitions, MPDroid can now perform data (i.e., func-
tionality point and permission data) feature extraction, MPDroid extracts the
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functionality information and the declared permissions from the textual func-
tional description of the Android app and its corresponding APK file respec-
tively. The goal here is to extract the app data features for building the mapping
relation between the declared functionalities and declared permissions for each
app. It consists of the following three contents.
Description functionality Point Extraction. We obtain the declared
functionality topics for all the app based on their functionality descriptions,
and use the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) on the descriptions to cluster
app into different functionality topics. We define the functionality vector set for
each app as a Func matrix, formulated as follows:
Func =

DF1,1 DF1,2 . . . DF1,n
DF2,1 DF2,2 . . . DF2,n
. . . . . . . . . . . .
DFm,1 DFm,2 . . . DFm,n
 (6)
DFi,j represents the probability that app ai belongs to topic Fj , 0 < DFi,j < 1
, n represents the number of topics in all app, m represents the number of apps.
For the newly target app, we can get the declaration functionality vector of the
app by matching the described information with the LDA trained model.
Declared Permission Extraction. For each app, MPDroid extracts its
APK file with apktool5 and obtains the declared permissions from its Android-
Mainfest file. By parsing the AndroidMainfest file, the full permission set can
be obtained as follows:
DP =

DP1,1 DP1,2 . . . DP1,n
DP2,1 DP2,2 . . . DP2,n
. . . . . . . . . . . .
DPm,1 DPm,2 . . . DPm,n
 (7)
where DPi,j = 1 represents that ai applies for permission DPj or 0 otherwise.
API-based Permission Extraction. Certain permissions will be required
5http://ibotpeaches.github.io/apktool
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when an app calls the Android APIs. To find out the real requested permissions
that an app actually uses by calling APIs, MPDroid adopts an open-source
tool named Androguard6 to statically analyze the app’s APK, and obtains the
code permissions of the app. MPDroid first traverses all the code files in the
APK, and detects the API in the file to obtain all the Android-related methods.
Then, according to the result of Pscout [22], the correspondence relation table
between the API and the permissions is built, and the Android API obtained by
the traversal scan is mapped with the permissions. Finally, we obtain the apps
code permissions. In our study, 16,343 apps were parsed, and a tree-shaped
relationship diagram of app API-permission information is constructed.
Compared to the information extracted from the AndroidManifest file, the
permissions obtained from the code are often more accurate, and in addition, the
code permissions are the foundation for the implementation of the Functionality
Point-Permission Set Identification in Section 3.4.
3.2. Over-declared permissions identification
The purpose of this phase is to identify and remove the permissions that
are over-declared in the app by the recommendation algorithm for the target
app. Figure 4 shows the overall framework of the over-declared permission
identification in MPDroid.
MPDroid leverages two datasets, i.e., the benign app dataset and the ma-
licious app dataset. We divided the benign app dataset into N parts, N -1
parts form the benign training set, and the remaining part as the target app
set that needs to remove the over-declared permissions. For the malignant app,
we perform the same operation. Our goal is to map the declared functional-
ity information to the corresponding reasonable permissions for the target app.
MPDroid employs an improved collaborative filtering algorithm to recommend
permissions for the remaining app set, i.e., the target app. The permission
recommendation procedures include following contents.
6Androguard: https://code.google.com/p/androguard
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Figure 4: Overall framework of over-declared permission identification
3.2.1. Similarity Computation
We assume that there are m apps. Each app has n functionalities, the
relationship between apps and functionalities is denoted by an m×n matrix,
i.e., the Func matrix. Each entry DFij in the matrix represents the probability
that the app belongs to this functionality point. The larger the probability value,
the more likely the app belongs to this functionality. Conversely, the smaller the
probability value, the less likely the app includes this functionality. Here, the
“Euclidean distance” is employed for the similarity computation. “Euclidean
distance” employs the Equation (8) to compute the distance between the target
app and the app located in the training set:
D ist(X,Y ) =
√√√√ n∑
i=1
(Xi − Yi) (8)
where X and Y represent the functionality vectors of app ai and aj respec-
tively. D ist(X,Y ) represents the distance between app ai and aj , the similarity
between app is calculated as equation (9):
S im (ai, aj) =
1
1 + D ist(X,Y )
(9)
12
3.2.2. Similar App Selection
After calculating the similarity values between the target app and the app
located in the training set, a set of similar apps can be identified. On the
other hand, in the process of permission identification, if a part of the high
similarity application is used for recommendation, the effect will be better than
the recommendation using all the applications. It is worth noting that since
the number of similar members obtained by the Top-K algorithm is fixed each
time, in fact, the number of similar members of the app is not well determined
and the number of similar members for each app is not necessarily the same,
which may lead the quality of similar members of the app being unguaranteed,
and resulting in poor recommendation results. Thus, MPDroid employs the
similarity threshold method to obtain a subset of similar app by setting a certain
threshold parameter T.
3.2.3. Permission Recommendation
MPDroid selects similar app with similarity greater than the threshold T as
candidate recommendation members for each target app, and then it uses the
similarity of the declaration functionality vectors of these similar members to
perform a comprehensive weighted calculation on the permissions they declare,
finally, it obtains a list of the permission recommendation results for the target
app. For example, the permission pi that the app ai may declare is weighted
according to the similarity value to calculate the recommended permission for
the target app, it is similar to the user-based collaborative filtering method. The
comprehensive recommendation value is defined as Rvai,i, and the calculation
formula is as equation (10):
Rvai,i = k
∑
aj∈F
S im (ai, aj)Rvaj ,i (10)
where k is a normalizing factor defined as 1/
∑
aj∈F S im (ai, aj) , F refers to the
app recommended member set whose similarity is greater than the threshold T,
Rvaj ,i is equals to 1 if app aj declares the permission, otherwise Rvaj ,i is equals
to 0 that indicates app aj does not declare the permission. After calculating a
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recommended value vector of the target app, we can get a list of recommended
permissions ranking from high recommended value to low. The larger the value
is, the higher possibility that the permission is needed for the app. Finally,
MPDroid uses the adaptive parameter based method [16] to generate the final
permission list.
It is worth noting that in order to avoid the wrong removal of normal per-
missions, MPDroid uses the malicious apps and the benign apps as the training
sets separately, and treats the difference between the recommendation result of
the malicious app and the benign app recommendation result as the permission
difference set. If the permissions are located in the difference set and also locted
in the target app’s permissions, so we call them the over-declared permissions.
Thus for the given target app, the difference set of the two recommended permis-
sion is removed from the declared permissions. As the recommendation result
of benign app often represents the permissions necessary for the app to imple-
ment the functionality, so we do not remove this part permissions. But for the
results of malicious app recommend permissions often tend to be more, because
in addition to the permissions required to support normal functionalities, there
are also include many dangerous permissions. So we believe that the different
set of recommendation permissions between a malicious app and a benign app
also represents dangerous permissions.
For each app in the training set, MPDroid extracts the declared functionality
from the description of the app and then establishs a mapping between function-
alities and permissions. Note that our method is a reasonable permission cross
recommendation process as shown in Figure 4, after updating a set of target
app permissions, we put the set of apps back into training set and continue to
train until all apps in the training set are recommended with reasonable permis-
sions, i.e., removing the over-declared permissions, compared with the Figure 2
in Section 2, we remove the over-declared permissions (P3, P6) of the target
app through the over-declared permission identification module.
14
3.3. Initial Description-minimum permission set identification
In order to generate a minimum set of permissions corresponding to the
description information, we propose an iterative algorithm called description-
minimum permission set identification, its purpose is to generate a minimum
permission sets corresponding to the Android app description (declaration func-
tionality). The whole process of iterations can be described as follow:
1. Initialize the training set: We divide the entire benign app set into N
parts marked as < A1, A2, . . . , AN >. Next we use the rest of N -1 parts
< A2, A3, . . . , AN > to identify the over-declared permissions for the tar-
get app set < A1 > by using the over-declared permission identification
method in Section 3.2.
2. Get the over-declared permissions for < A1 > and then remove them.
3. Update the training set: Put < A1 > that had removed the over-declared
permissions back to the training set and use the next part of the app as the
target app to identify the over-declared permissions. For example, we use
the app < A1, A3, . . . , AN > to identify the over-declared permissions for
the < A2 >. Finally, all the N parts would be removed the over-declared
permissions.
4. After all the N parts have been removed the over-declared permissions,
we get the new update dataset, we call this process one-time iteration .
Next, we repeat the step 1) to step 3) until the permissions do not change.
We finally get the minimum permission set of the benign app after several
times iteration.
3.4. Functionality Point-Permission Set Identification
MPDroid obtains the initial minimum permission set corresponding to the
target app by Description-minimum permission set identification algorithm in
Section 3.3. However, that is only the theoretical result. We need to further
combine the permissions of the app actually calls to further refine the mini-
mum permission set corresponding to the target app. So in this phase, we will
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mine the permission set corresponding to the functionality point obtained by
the LDA topic model from the perspective of the functionality point-permission
set. We use the static parsing permissions and the permission of the app declare
itself to build a model to obtain each functionality point corresponding permis-
sions. Thus, it can further refine the initial description-minimum permission
set. Through this, we can obtain our final description-minimum permission set.
We select all the apps with the same functionality topic in Func matrix and
traverse all the apps for each topic Tm. For each app ai, the permission that
it contains is expressed as ai = [P1, P2, Pl, ...PN ]. Accordingly, we define the
support degree corresponding to each permission as equation (11):
RPl (ai|Pl) = Prm × 1 (11)
where RPl (ai|Pl) represents the support degree for each permission, Prm is the
probability corresponding to the functionality Tm.
Next, we add up the values of the same permissions for all apps (assuming
that total number of apps is n) under each topic Tm. Then for each permission
Pl, its total permission support degree to the topic Tm is:
RPl (Tm|Pl) =
∑n
i=1RPl (ai|Pl)∑n
i=1 Prm (ai|Tm)
(12)
where Prm (ai|Tm) represents the probability that ai belongs to Tm. We
calculate the permission with the highest m value as the most relevant per-
mission for the topic. If give out a new app with the functionality topic
is aj = [T1, T2, Tm, . . . , TN ], and its corresponding permissions probability is
[Pr1, P r2, P rm, . . . , P rN ]. As for the topic Tm, the corresponding most rele-
vant t permissions value is {RP1 × Prm, RP2 × Prm, . . . , RPt × Prm}. Then
we plus the permission values of all the same permissions in [T1, T2, Tt, . . . , TN ]
and arrange them from large to small to obtain the permission that the RPl
value is greater than the value of support degree threshold θsupport, i.e., the
permissions recommended according to the functionality point directly.
Finally, we inspect whether the initial description-minimum permission set
in Section 3.3 exists the permission that the support degree is too low. If it
16
Figure 5: Permission-based risk assessment framework
exists, we remove these permissions. This way, we obtain the final description-
minimum permission set according to the target app. As show in Figure 2, the
permission set of the target app changes from {P1, P2, P4, P5} to {P1, P2, P4}
in this phase since P5 is the permission whose support degree is too low.
3.5. Permission-Based Risk Evaluation
We can perform permission-based risk evaluation with MPDroid. Figure 5
shows a permission-based risk evaluation framework. The key idea is to take
use of the description-minimum permission set, when a target app comes, we
recommend the permissions to the target app by use the collaborative filtering
method. Then, we compare the difference between the recommendation per-
missions and the actually declared permissions of the target app, and through
this, we can further calculate the risk value for the target app.
Considering the fact that almost all the malicious apps have declared more
permissions than what the original application needs, we calculate the risk level
based on the gap between the malicious app and the benign app. Specially,
the minimum permission set of the benign app has been identified already.
Since the permissions recommended by benign apps often represent normal and
required permissions, so the one that is not recommended in the app’s declare
permissions can be regarded as abnormal or does not support the permissions
required by its declare functionalities. Therefore, given a target app ai, its
declared permissions are DPi =< DPi,1, . . . DPi,M > and the recommended
candidate permissions are RP ∗ (ai) =< pi,1, pi,2, . . . , pi,N >. We can define the
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unexpected permissions UP (ai) as equation (13):
pi ∈ UP ∗ (ai)↔ pi ∈ DP (ai)−RP ∗ (ai) ∩DP (ai) (13)
where ∗ ∈ {B,M}. B represents the permissions recommended by the benign
app, M represents the list of permissions recommended by the malicious app.
Also, the recommended permissions by the malicious set RPM (ai) will con-
tain not only the necessary permissions but also the risk permissions. On the
contrary, most of the permissions recommended by the benign set are likely
to be necessary. Thus, we define the risk permissions based on the permission
gap RPM (ai)−RPM (ai)∩RPB (ai). The gap between the malicious sets and
benign sets can be used to find the risk permissions, such as the permission P3
of target app in Figure 2. Here, the risk permissions RiP (ai) can be formally
defined as equation(14):
pi ∈ RiP (ai)↔ pi ∈ RPM (ai)−RPM (ai) ∩RPB (ai) (14)
If the target app has an unexpected permission and also belongs to the risk
permissions, we consider the app is a risky app, a risky app is defined as follow
equation:
ai ∈ Risk ↔ pi ∈ RiP (ai) &pi ∈ UPB (ai) (15)
Finally, we can calculate the risk value as follow equation:
Risk (ai) =
∑
pj∈(UPB(ai)∩RiP (ai))
r (pj) (16)
We calculate the risk level based on the permissions protection levels: normal
and dangerous according to the Android permission mechanism. The scores of
the permissions for two protection levels are assigned as 1 and 2 respectively.
Here, r (pj) refers to the risk of permission based on its protection level.
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4. Experiments
4.1. Experimental Setup
We use the app market dataset from [23]. After processing the dataset,
we choose 16,343 app with at least 100+ downloads and five stars in Google
Play as the benign dataset finally. The malicious dataset was retrieved from
VirusShare7. Since the VirusShare does not offer app descriptions, so we use the
package identifier to map it into the one in the “app market” dataset. Finally,
we find 524 matched items and regard them as the malicious app dataset. For
the dataset of functionality point-permission set, we have selected 32,671 apps as
the dataset to mine functionality point-permission relationships, which contains
both the text information and APK files.
There are two kinds of permissions in the Android ecosystem: one is the
system permission which is defined by the Android platform, and the other is
the custom permission defined by developers themselves. In our experiment, we
do not consider the custom permissions in the app because they are only defined
and used by developer themselves. Especially, as the Android platform has many
different versions, we take all permissions that have ever been defined, whatever
used or not. Table 2 summarizes the dataset [24] and Table 3 summarizes the
experiment parameters.
Table 2: DataSet Summary
App Datasets Number of Applications
Benign App 16343
Malicious App 524
App for Functionality Point-Permission
Set Identification
32671
Permission Dataset Number of Permissionss
System permissions 285
7http://virusshare.com
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Table 3: Experimental Parameter Descriptions
Symbols Descriptions
Topic Number the numbers of the topic in LDA
Similarity threshold Tb, Tm
the threshold value of the similarity
member selected employed for
permission recommendation
Support degree threshold θsupport
the support degree filter value in
Functionality Point-Permission set
identification phase
Test set ratio the ratio of the test app set
4.2. Analysis the results for each phase
4.2.1. Over-declared permissions identification
Over-declaration permission identification process has been described in Sec-
tion 3.2. In fact, the results by the LDA model often result in a sparse declara-
tion functionality matrix. Therefore, in the specific implementation process, we
made an inverted table according to the functionality relevance, and only the
functionality-related app is calculated, which can greatly reduce the amount of
calculation. On the other hand, considering that the number of benign app is
much larger than the malicious app, so we select the threshold for the benign app
as Tb=0.6 and malicious app we have chosen the threshold Tm=0.4 according
to [16]. Furthermore, we use the method based on adaptive parameter in [16] to
filter out all the permissions that are significantly higher than other permissions
until the data is balanced. Finally, we remove the difference set recommended
by the malicious and benign app in declared permissions, thus an over-declared
permission identification process is completed.
4.2.2. Initial Description-minimum permission set identification
In this phase, our goal is to identify the minimum permission set information
corresponding to the app. We first randomly divide the benign apps into 5 parts,
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i.e., N=5 in Section 3.3. Then we perform the initial description-minimum
permission set identification method. In the actual experiments, we found that
after 2 iterations, the permission data no longer changes, which means that the
initial description-minimum permission set is obtained.
Table 4: An Example of the Initial Description-Minimum Permission Set
Functional Description
Over-Declared
Permission
Initial Minimum
Permission Set
mission real music studio stude
nt love reach locat midtown stu
dio offer instruct level excel mu
sicianship piano voic drum invo
lv north food spring station ped
estrian access teacher cost lesso
n registr date event program ap
p latest watch tab wall share fa
mily class amp loop tube class
channel latest music video
ACCESS COARSE
LOCATION
CALL PHONE
ACCESS FINE LO
CATION
AMERA
ACCESS NETWORK
STATE
SEND SMSC RECORD AUDIO
WRITE EXTERNAL
STORAGE
READ PHONE STA
TE
In addition, to illustrate our experimental results, we also provide an example
of the minimum permission set identification as shown in Table 4. From that, we
can see that an app in our benign dataset requires 10 permissions which are more
than it actually needs. We identify the over-declared permissions and generate
the initial minimum permission set. The words like “locat, video, music, north”
in the functionality descriptions are related to ‘location’ or ‘audio’. Thus, these
permissions like RECORD AUDIO and ACCESS FINE LOCATION enable the
basic functionalities of the app and they are in the minimum permission set
identified by MPDroid. On the contrast, we identify three permissions which
are over-declared from the app descriptions: the functional descriptions do not
include words related to ‘call’, ‘sms’ or ‘camera’. This means that these three
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permissions are unrelated permissions different from the most apps with the
similar description, which may lead to the leak of sensitive information.
In fact, the apps with a set of fixed functionalities will contain a minimum set
of permissions corresponding to itself in theory. However, in the actual operation
process, due to the inaccuracy of the app description data, the limitation of the
amount of the app data, and the accuracy of the recommendation algorithm, it
is impossible to find the minimum permission set. Through our method, we can
continue to narrow the scope of the declare permissions without removing the
reasonable permissions. This way, we can obtain we can get the most reasonable
permission set of the app (i.e., the minimum permission set in this article).
According to our iterative algorithm in Section 3.3, it does not delete reasonable
permissions. The specific theoretical proof is as follows:
For a testing app, suppose its declared permission set is DP , and the permis-
sion set recommended by the bengin app is BP , and the permission set recom-
mended by the maclicious app is MP , assume the minimum permissions set of
the app is MinP . From a overall perspective: MPDroid will remove some per-
missions for each iteration. Thus, the number of permissions originally declared
by the app will gradually decrease. However, since MinP ⊆ BP,MinP ⊆MP ,
there is MP −BP ∩MinP = ∅, i.e., the permissions that are removed each time
are not the permissions in the minimum permission set, which can guarantee
the lower bound of the final recommended result is greater than or equal to
MinP .
From the perspective of the recommendation process: the difference set of
MP−BP will removed from the declaration permission setDP in each iteration,
and MP includes a minimum set permissions and the risk permissions distinct
from BP , i.e., the result of MP − BP is risk permission (also called over-
declared permission). In the n-th iteration, the recommendation result of the
MP is unchanged, and BP removes some of the MP recommended permissions
in the n-1 iterations. Thus, the permissions are gradually reduced compared to
n-1 times, which also leads to fewer permissions being removed in DP . When
the permission gap is reduced to 0 or close to 0, the permissions removed during
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the iteration process will be fewer, and the DP set tends to be stabilize. At this
time, the DP set basically does not include the risk permissions and basically
converges. Therefore, MPDroid does not incorrectly remove the permissions
that the app actually uses.
In addition, the over-declared permission identification of the testing set
app is based on difference set recommended by the malicious training set apps
and the benign training set apps, as shown in phase 1 and phase 2 in Figure
3. In this step, we mainly identify the over-declared permission for 80% of
benign data (16,343) in training set, i.e., 13,075 apps, and the result is that 635
permissions were removed, involving 479 apps, accounting for 3.66% of the total
apps. For the bengin test apps (3,268), the result is that 301 permissions were
removed, involving 205 apps, accounting for 6.27% of the total benign testing
apps. This also shows that there are also cases of over-declared permissions even
for the benign app. However, for the malicious testing apps, 58 permissions were
removed, involving 37 apps, accounting for 35.58% of the total malicious testing
apps. These results show that the proportion of malicious apps which with
over-declared permissions is much higher than that of a benign apps, which is
in line with the real-world common sense.
4.2.3. Functionality Point-Permission Set Identification
The purpose of this phase is to mine the relationship between the functional-
ity points obtained by LDA and the declared permissions directly. We calculate
the relationship between app functionality points and permissions in real calls,
and get the closest permission for each functionality point, then we get the ac-
tual permission set for each app. During the experiment, 32671 benign apps
were selected, which contains the text information and APK file.
We map the functionality point information and the declared permission
information of all apps, and implement the functionality point permission set
mining according to Section 3.4. Then we obtain the support degree of each
functionality point corresponding to the permission and arrange them from high
to low. In terms of the code permission, we do the same thing. Then, we select
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Figure 6: An Example of Functionality point-permission set identification
the permission with the support degree greater than 0.1 and take the union
of code permission and the declaration permission corresponding to the same
functionality point. Meanwhile, we combine the results of the two to obtain the
functionality point-permission set relationship. Finally, we inspect whether the
initial minimum description permission set after the iterations in Section 3.3
exist the low support degree permissions. If it exists, remove these permissions,
and thus we get the final description-minimum permission set corresponding to
the app.
Figure 6 shows the functionality point-permission set relationship corre-
sponding to the app named screener2. The permission with the highest per-
mission support degree is permission ACCESS NETWORK STATE, and its
support degree is 0.89. It is the actual permissions required by the app, and
the minimum permission support degree is the permission DEVICE POWER,
whose support degree is 0.0000146. This permission will be removed by our
method since the permission support degree is too low. In this way, we have
implemented the functionality point-permission set identification.
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4.2.4. Permission-Based Risk Evaluation
In order to prove the effectiveness of our method, we conduct an analysis
comparison on our approach and the previous method [16] by using the following
evaluation metrics, the metrics are defined as follows:
Mean Average Precision (MAP): MAP is a comprehensive evaluation
of the accuracy for the recommended permissions. In our study, to test whether
the recommended permission is in the actual declared permission list, we also
consider the relative order of the recommendation results, the calculation for-
mula is as follow:
MAP =
∑M
k=1
1
Nk
∑Nk
l=1
Rl
l Il
M
(17)
where M represents the total number of app in the test set, Nk represents the
number of permissions recommended for the kth app . Rl indicates the number
of permissions that really apply for the top l recommended permissions. Il=1
indicates that the lth permission in the recommended ranking is really applied
by the app, otherwise Il=0 indicates that the recommended permission does not
been applied.
The ratio of the app with Unexpected Permissions (AUPR): The
AUPR is defined as the percent of the app which has unexpected permissions
in the testing dataset.
AUPR =
1
M
M∑
i=1
K
(
UPB (ai)
)
(18)
where if
∣∣UPB (ai)∣∣ > 0, then K (ai, Risk) = 1, otherwise K (ai, Risk) = 0.
Risk app Ratio (RAR): The RAR is defined as the ratio of risk app in
the test datasets.
RAR =
1
M
M∑
i=1
K (ai,Risk) (19)
where if ai ∈ Ris k, then K (ai, Risk) = 1, Otherwise K (ai, Risk) = 0.
Necessary recall (NR): The NR is used to measure the recall of our
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approach, it defined as follow:
NR (APPt) =
|APs in top-n |
n
(20)
where n is the number of the necessary permissions of APPt, the APs are APPt’s
necessary permissions, and top−n is the set of top-n permissions returned by
an approach. For a set of apps, NR is the mean of the NR values for all apps
in it.
Total-recall ratio (TRR): The TRR is used to measure the effort our
approach requires to achieve total recall, i.e., to recommend all the correct
permissions for an app. It defined as follow:
TRR (APPt) =
 nmim|APs| , if APs −RPs = ∅nall
|APs| , otherwise
(21)
where APs are APPt’s necessary permissions, and RPs are the recommend
permissions by our mehtod. In a nutshell, TRR measures that if we want to
recall all the correct permissions of APPt, how many permissions on average will
be recommended by an approach for one correct permission. More specifically,
if the approach can achieve total recall for APPt, we simply compute the ratio
of the minimal number of recommended permissions to achieve total recall,
i.e., nmim, and the number of APPt’s correct permissions, i.e., |APs|, APPt’s
TRR. Otherwise, we penalize TRR by replacing nmim with the total number
of permissions captured by the training set, i.e., nall. The closer TRR is to one,
the better it is. For a set of apps, TRR is the mean of the TRR values for all
apps in it.
To evaluate the performance of MPDroid, we compare it with the SF method,
which is the state-of-the-art bias-based recommendation method [16]. In the
experiments, we randomly selected 80% of the benign app as the training set
to establish a description information and permissions mapping, as well as for
the malicious app. The remaining 20% benign apps and 20% of the malicious
apps constitute the test set. After using the description-minimum permission
set identification algorithm to identify and remove over-declared permissions
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in benign app set, the corresponding description-minimum permission set re-
lationship is obtained. Next, according to the description-permission mapping,
the training set is used to recommend permissions to the test apps. We set
the Topic Number=100, Tb=0.6, Tm=0.4, θsupport =0.1, and then calculate the
MAP , AUPR, RAR and ARISK evaluation indicators. ARISK represents
the average risk value for the test set app calculate by equation(16).
Table 5: Comparison of experimental results (20% benign app as a test set)
Approach AUPR RAR ARISK MAP NR TRR
MPDroid 0.334 0.104 0.335 0.931 0.865 1.257
SF 0.314 0.068 0.200 0.927 0.859 1.489
Improvement 6.4% 52.9% 67.5% 0.4% 0.6% 18.5%
Table 6: Comparison of experimental results (20% malicious app as a test set)
Approach AUPR RAR ARISK MAP NR TRR
MPDroid 0.846 0.356 2.221 0.854 0.712 1.72
SF 0.779 0.288 1.817 0.844 0.705 2.619
Improvement 10.9% 23.6% 22.2% 0.4% 0.1% 52.3%
Tables 5 and Tables 6 are the experiment results compared with SF method.
Specifically, Table 5 is a benign apps that are used as a test set. Table 6 presents
the results where malicious apps are used as the test set. The experimental
results shows:
• 1) Under the experimental settings, MPDroid obtains higherAUPR, RAR,
ARISK, MAP and NR values consistently, and TRR is the opposite,
which indicates higher risk identification performance.
• 2) Not only for the malicious apps, some of the benign apps are overprivi-
leged (i.e., over declared the unexpected or risk permissions). In generally,
the malicious apps are generally much more likely to be overprivileged than
benign apps.
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• 3) For the benign apps, the proposed MPDroid outperforms on RAR and
ARISK compared with SF by 52.9% and 67.5% respectively. This shows
that MPDroid can provide developers and users with more reasonable
permission configuration, and reducing the over privilege problem.
• 4) The MAP in SF and MPDroid changes little. This indicates that
although the benign app has over-declared permissions, but the number
of over-declared permissions is still small compared to the total number
of permissions of the app. Generally, the over-declared permissions often
appear in a few popular apps.
4.2.5. Studies on the Parameters
In this Section, we discuss how the parameters impact the results in terms
of AUPR, RAR, ARISK, MAP since they are the main goal of MPDroid.
(1) Impact of Number of Topic
MPDroid uses the LDA topic model to process the app description infor-
mations to obtain the functional feature vector. In order to study the impact
of different topics on the final experimental results, we use the benign apps
and the malicious apps as test sets respectively to evaluate the performance of
MPDroid under different number of topics. In the experiments, the number
of topics varies from 60 to 100 with a step value of 5, the test set ratio is set
as 20%. In addition, according to [16], we set the similarity threshold Tb=0.6,
Tm=0.4 since it can obtain better results.
Figure 7 and Figure 8 show the experimental results of benign apps and
malicious apps as the test set respectively, we can obtain that:
• whether it is a benign app or a malicious app as a test set, MPDroid can
obtain better experimental results overall. This indicates that removing
the over-declaration permission of the benign app can better identify over-
declared permissions.
• the number of topics has a certain impact on each metric. For the benign
app as the test set, the RAR, ARISK are higher when the number of
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 7: Benign apps as the test set
topics is 60. However, for malicious app as the test set, the number of
topics is 65. This indicates that the same number of topics has little
impact on different test sets.
• For the AUPR and MAP , the number of topics will affect AUPR and
MAP to a certain extent, but there is no fixed rule. For example, for the
benign app as a testing set, when the number of topics is 60, the MAP
is the lowest, and for the malicious app as the testing app set, the MAP
achieve the lowest value is when the number of topics is 90.
(2) Impact of Support degree threshold θsupport
The support degree threshold θsupport in Section 3.4 mainly considers the
permissions required for the actual API call in the app, which can make the
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 8: Malicious apps as the test set
recommended permissions more accurate. To study the impact of the support
degree threshold, we tested the benign app and the malicious app test set sep-
arately and compared the test results with different support degree thresholds.
We set the initial value is 0.0.5, and then we vary the θsupport from 0.1 to 0.6
with a step value of 0.1, the similarity threshold Tb=0.6, Tm=0.4, and the test
set ratio is 20%. In addition, since the support calculation only occurs in the
MPDroid method, and the SF method is not affected by the parameter so that
the result of SF is a horizontal line.
Figure 9 and Figure 10 show the experimental results of benign apps as the
test set and malicious apps as the test set, respectively. we can know that:
• Regardless of whether it is a benign or malignant test set, when the sup-
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 9: Benign apps as the test set
port threshold vary from 0.1 to 0.4, AUPR, RAR, and ARISK change
little. However, when the θsupport is greater than 0.4, the detection de-
creases, indicating that the risk permission is not filtered when the θsupport
below 0.4. When θsupport is too high (greater than 0.4), the app risk
permissions are filtered basically, the remaining permissions are likely to
belong to the app itself and the detected risk is smaller.
• The recommendation accuracy rate of the benign test set is always greater
than the malicious test set on the MAP . When the θsupport changes, the
MAP of the benign test set changes little, but the malicious test set
changes significantly. It indicats that the risk permission contained in the
malicious app are more, and it will affect the accuracy of the recommen-
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 10: Malicious apps as the test set
dation.
(3)Impact of test set ratio
The test set ratio indicates the performance of MPDroid under different data
scales. In order to study the effect of different test set ratios on experimental
performance, we also tested the benign apps and the malicious apps test set
separately, and compared the test results under different test set ratio. In the
experiments, we vary the test set ratio from 10 to 40 percent with a step value
of 5 percent and the similarity threshold is Tb=0.6, Tm=0.4, θsupport=0.1.
Figure 11 and Figure 12 show the experimental results with benign apps as
the test set and malicious apps as the test set, respectively. It can be obtained
that:
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 11: Benign apps as the test set
• For the benign app as the test set, the AUPR, RAR, ARISK value are
the highest when the test set ratio is 10 percent, indicating that the test
performance is the best. For the malicious test set, there is no fixed rule,
indicating that different data sets and test set ratios will affect the effect
of the model, and MPDroid is generally better than the SF method.
• For the MAP , the recommended effect is best when the benign test set
ratio is 20%, and for the malicious test set app, the test set ratio is 25%.
It shows that different test sets and test set ratios will affect the accuracy
of the recommendations.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 12: Malicious apps as the test set
4.3. Limitations
MPDroid has some limitations:
1. The implementation of MPDroid relies on the mapping the functionalities
to permissions, but the functionality is only the features extracted from the
app description. If the app description does not describe the functionalities
of the app properly, the recommendation results will also be affected. To
alleviate this issue, we use a large amount of app description information
as a training set for training, which can largely ensure that the training
model contains most of the description information, thus it can ensure the
accuracy of subsequent permission recommendations. Meanwhile, we will
also try to extract more granular and accurate functional features, such as
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adding other auxiliary information in future. In addition, we would add
manual annotation if necessary.
2. Currently, the method of description-minimum permission set identifi-
cation relies on the recommendation precision, and the establishment of
model depends on data set. To alleviate this issue when we choose the
dataset, the apps with at least 100+ downloads and five stars in Google
Play are considered as the benign dataset, and the malicious app set we se-
lect from VirusShare website directly, which can slove the problem to some
extent. In the future, we will enrich the mechanism for model building
and further optimize the model to make it more generalized.
3. In the static analysis phase of the model, we cannot achieve the com-
pletely correct permissions to parse the app since some malicious apps
re-packaging, or the interference of code mixing. Generally, some develop-
ers are not familiar with Android’s business logic and lead to some useless
code, result in matching too many permissions. Therefore, we will focus
on improving static analysis and increasing the accuracy of the analysis
in our follow-up work.
5. RELATED WORK
The spurt development of mobile Internet has promoted the security problem
of mobile app to become a hot spot in the industry. Due to the imperfection
of the Android permission mechanism, some irresponsible developers use the
permissions of the Android app indiscriminately, and the user does not realize
the importance of the problem so that led to a series of privacy leaks and would
pose significant risks to users and the entire mobile ecosystem.
One cornerstone of the Android security design is the permission system. An
app must hold the permissions to successfully access the security and privacy
critical methods. The permissions or the risk caused by the permissions have
received a lot of attentions by many security types of research. Some studies are
also dedicated to reminding users to potential risks through study permission di-
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alogs, further or through improvements to enhance the permissions dialog [6] [8],
but the impact of these methods on end users is still very small, users may still
experience the risk behind it.
The above research is mainly based on the permission mechanism already
contained in Android, and does not modify the underlying architecture of An-
droid permissions. Their research content mainly focuses on two aspects. On
the one hand, it is aimed at users, they try to make users understand the per-
missions by giving hints. For example, Kelley [25] designs the dialog content
of the permission prompt box in more detail, reminds the user of the conse-
quences when using specific permissions and what is the implied risk will cause,
but they does not explain the details of the resources accessed and whether it
may lead to the disclosure of some private information, Bin Liu [26] propose a
methodology PPA to learn privacy profiles for permission settings and leverage
these profiles in a personalized privacy assistant that actively supports users in
configuring their permission settings. On the other hand, it is mainly facing
for developers, it remind the developers to strengthen their understanding of
permissions, do not declare unnecessary or wrong permissions during the de-
velopment process, but because Android development document do not have
mature API descriptions, not only not enough details, but there may be some
errors [27]. So in a summarize, no matter whether it is for users or developers,
the issue of permissions has always been an urgent problem to be solved.
In order to solve the above problems, many studies decided to turn to use
machine learning [1] [28] or recommended algorithms to solve the problem of
permission redundancy, and then recommend reasonable permissions. For ex-
ample, Min Peng [28] proposed a app risk score calculating method ARSM based
on app-permission bipartite graph model which combine the correlation of apps
permissions and users interests. Whyper [13] and AutoCog [14] extracts various
feature word combinations from the description information of the Android app
as the app’s declaration functionality and map them to the app declared per-
mission, and through the gap between them to determine whether the declared
permission meets the described functionality, and further determine the risk.
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Besides, there are some other methods to extract a variety of feature vec-
tors through code analysis to detect malicious apps. For example, Bartel [29]
proposed a tool named “COPES” to detecting permission gaps using static anal-
ysis. It extracts from the Android framework bytecode a table that maps every
method of the API to a set of permissions the method needs to be executed prop-
erly. Mujahid [30] implement an technique in a tool called PERMLYZER which
automatically detects permission issues from apps APK to study the permission
related issues in Wearable apps. More recently, some studies [31] [32] [33] also
focus on recommend permissions by the used APIS, such as Karim [31] pre-
sented a tool named ApMiner which combines static analysis and association
rule discovery to make app permission recommendations, and the results shown
that ApMiner performs better than PScout and Androguard in terms of app
permission recommendations. However, the average F1-score of APMiner is not
sufficiently high (only approximately 55%) for it to be used in practice. Bao [32]
propose an approach named APRecCF ,which is based on collaborative filtering
technique, the start point is that apps that use similar APIs often support sim-
ilar features, it measures the similarity of two apps based on the APIs used by
the apps and the result show that their approach achieve significant improve-
ment in terms of the precision, recall, F1-score and MAP of the top-k results
over Karim et al.s approach. More over, based on [32], Bao [33] also propose
two novel approaches to realize permission recommendation, the first approach
utilizes a collaborative filtering technique utilizes and the second approach rec-
ommends permissions based on a text mining technique that uses a naive Bayes
multinomial classification algorithm, which show a better preference than the
others. To best of our knowledge, the best work of permission recommendation
is PerRec [18], which leverages mining-based techniques and data fusion meth-
ods to recommend permissions for given apps according to their used APIs and
API descriptions, and their results show that PerRec significantly improves the
state-of-the-art approaches APRecCF [33], APRecTEXT [33] and Axplorer [34].
The main disadvantage of the above methods is that the permissions de-
clared by the app are treated as actually needed permissions by the app, but
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this is not always true, Android apps tend to be overprivileged. According to
several studies, e.g., [7] and [8], overprivileged apps are not the minority, but
the majority. Therefore, it is necessary to identify the permissions that an app
really needs, that is, its minimum permissions set as the permissions the app
actually needs. Further, if given a functionality point, we can find a way to
identify the minimum permission set corresponding to the functionality point,
i.e., an app can declare the permissions to implement this functionality point.
Then, it is possible to significantly improve the performance of over-declared
permission detection so that to find a minimum set of permissions for the app
of its describe information.
In order to achieve the goals, different from the above methods, at a higher
level, our study is similar and creative to these former approaches. Our approach
combines static analysis and collaborative filtering to identify the minimum
permission set of Android apps. We measure the textual descriptions of the app
in Google Play and the relevant permissions it required in a more accurate way.
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
Detecting the overprivileged permissions for the mobile applications is con-
sidered as a critical and valuable task to enhance the permission system for
the mobile service ecosystem. Considering the miss match between the de-
clared functionalities and the requested permissions to support the declared
functionalities, we propose an iteration approach that combines static analysis
and collaborative filtering to identify the minimum permission set for the mobile
apps. The static analysis is used to achieve the real requested permissions for
each mobile app, and a description-minimum permission set iteration algorithm
based on collaborative filtering is developed to mine the relationships between
the declared functionalities and the minimum requested permissions, so that
we can detect the over-requested permissions and identify the high risk appli-
cations. Comparing with the previous state-of-the-art method, our MPDroid
method can effectively identify the abnormal use of permissions and generate
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better permission recommendation configuration results, thereby reducing the
problem of mismatch between functionalities and permissions. For the users,
only need to have a description information of the app, so we can predict the
permission required for the description information according to our model. In
addition, this model also can be used to analyze the permissions of existing
Android applications and evaluate the risks of the app.
For the future works, we will consider more declarative functionality infor-
mation, such as user’s comment information, app privacy policy information,
and the classification information to improve the accuracy of the description
functionality. At the same time, we will also add a new data cleaning mecha-
nism to ensure the security of the declare permissions. In addition, since the
description-minimum permission set identification module relies on datasets,
we will further improve our model by focusing on related data cleaning and
mining techniques, combining with the most advanced permission identification
algorithms. We envision our method would help the developers to configure the
requested permissions and design the declared functionality.
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